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ABSTRACT

In essence,
this paper;

I have attempted a two - fold objective in

the first, to contribute something concrete

toward the establishment of a more exact and meaningful!
"science" of politics, and in the second instance, to
provide a clearer understanding of the actual decision
making process in contemporary communist last European
society*

With regard to the former goal, I have devised a
"model" which I feel integrates in a fruitful and novel
way innovative aspects of social sciences which are
relevant to the phenomena studied.

The model adopts as

its theoretical unit of study the national "system" level
of decision making and is thus based upon the premises
and logics of "structural - functional" analysis.
addition,

In

the model employs the decision making unit or

"variable" as the focus of empirical investigation, sub
stantiated by the decision theory of the "economic rationale"
The former is intended to describe and explain the "what",
the "how" and the "when" of certain political decision
behaviour in communist East Europe, while the latter is
particularly useful in deriving the "why".

In conjunction with these elements of theoretical
analysis,

I have proposed, as the most realistic and

productive source of raw data, socio - political empirical
iii
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behaviour.

The systemized assimilation, organization and

interpretation of such behaviour,

together with its

explanation in terms of the theoretical units of analysis,
best summarizes that general social science approach
which currently travels under the name of "behaviouralism".
It is ray hope and expectation that this particular inte
gration of theory and fact will lead to a political
"science" which is not only useful in observation,
description and explanation of adverse social phenomena,
but also in their prediction, prevention and control.

With respect to my second objective,

i.e. the clear

understanding of the communist decision making process
at the national level, I feel that the model not only
contributes to one's idea of what is actually "going on"
in communist societies, but more fundamentally, the "how"
and the "why" of a great deal of their behaviour.

Of

particular significance is the emphasis on the interdiscip
linary relationships between significant "variables" of
political behaviour which form part of the political structure
"per se" and those variables which inhabit the environment
within which the political structure must function.
Although time and space prevented a special treatment of
the more specifically sociological factors, this inter
relationship remains a theme throughout.

Therefore the model will focus more precisely on the
political aspects of decision making while at the same
iv
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time attempt to discover the interractions between the political
and non - political features which account for the differences
between the polarities of the "orthodox" and "liberal" communist
orientations, between the "true People's Republic" and the
"reactionary state", and between the stable and "safe" soc
ialist society and a dangerous form of "crisis - provoking"
communism.
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INTRODUCTION

During the night of August 20 - 21, 1968, Soviet
military forces,

together with units of other Warsaw Pact

allies, invaded Czechoslovakia.

Such an event broke nearly

ten years of relative calm in socialist East Europe in a
fashion which raised many questions concerning modern,
industrialized, post - war communism.

On the superficial level, one may ask "What was the
'real' purpose of the invasion?"

"What precisely did the

Soviet Union (nominally the Warsaw Pact Alliance) expect
or even hope to gain by such an uncivilized act?"
exactly was Czechoslovakia's

"What

'crime' which warranted such

an imposition by military force?"

Quite clearly, these

questions barely scratch the surface of the more basic and
substantive matters which must be investigated to render
any answers to them truly meaningful.

One must further examine the underlying socio - economic
and political features which have given rise to such a
crisis.

What are the environmental factors and relationships

which characterize a "stable" and "peaceful" communism in
today's industrial world?

What are the socio - political

bases for the current "orthodox" communist practices on the
one hand, and the distinct "liberal" orientation on the other?
What are the structural relationships between the political
and the non - political aspects of East European communism
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2
which account for one nation's being "in tune" and
"harmonizing" with the ^socialist realities" and receiving
the rewards therefrom, while another nation is simultaneously
labelled as"Reactionary", "revisionist",

infested with

"enemies of the people", and subjected to the penalties of
non - conformity?

Satisfactory answers to these more fundamental questions
are hard to come by.

The analytical equipment of the

contemporary social scientist is barely sufficiently sophis
ticated to precisely pinpoint the problems and give some
general direction for their solution, let alone provide for
a set of "pat" answers which are at once realistic and
workable.

If this were the case, social phenomena would

be adequately predictable and effectively controllable
such that serious conflicts could be avoided in the first
instance.

While such a "science" is the more ultimate goal of
many sodlal and political theorists, I must state at the
outset that my efforts here have not been directed toward
such an ambitious objective.

Although I do claim that

there are some predictive and control merits to the
theoretical construct which I present, my main purpose
has been analytical and explanatory in nature.

I believe

that the "model" which I have created:portrays quite
accurately the political decision making process in the
communist societies in question, both in its national and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
international applications.

Such, a theory also throws

considerable light upon the more fundamental interactions
and relationships between political and social factors
which have remained in the shadows for some time.

It is also my intention that the model presented
will provide the reader with a theoretical and structural
framework by which he can more easily and accurately
locate, observe, describe and explain the more fundamental
questions having roots in the political and social
environment of contemporary communist societies.

In

effect, I hop* that this theory, and those which may grow
out of it, will prepare much of the theoretical and
methodological groundwork prerequisite to a more complete
and ideal science of politics, characterized not only by
the capacities of description, explanation and measurement
of adverse social phenomena, but also of their prediction,
prevention and control.
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4
THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE FUNCTIONALISM
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE COMPARATIVE MODEL

The synthesis of comparative politics and model theory
is a relatively new innovation in political science.

Compar

ative government, as an approach to understanding different
types of political decision making, has existed since the
time of the Greek city state, especially with the simplistic
tri-partite Aristotelian classification of political
systems.

The comparative effort in politics however,

has since experienced considerable academic "ebb and flow"
over the centuries and even the "high water mar k s " have
been substantially lacking in both content and form to
adequately explain the political phenomena for which they
were devised.

Since World War II however, with the complexities of
political life evolving therefrom, comparative politics
has once again risen to the challenge.

Perhaps the most

significant post-war development in this regard has been
the emersion of the new "third world" states in world
politics.

Of paramount importance have been, firstly,

the artificial political divisions in Africa, the Middle
East, and Asia;

secondly, the many pre-war colonial

territories gaining independence; and thirdly the
"liberation" of several areas, notably China, and the
remoulding of others in a communist form, such as the
communist regimes of Eastern Europe.
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A second post-war phenomenon acting as a catalyst in
the resurgence of comparative politics has been the trend
towards a much larger governmental participation in the
affairs of most societies,

thus in a sense producing at

least a qualitatively new type of politics not unaccompanied
by its own peculiar problems and phenomena.

The third post-war development signalling the new
comparative movement has been the re-establishment of
"internationalism**, especially by the major beneficiaries
of the war, the United States and the Ü.S.S.R.

For political

scientists this has produced whole new areas of study such
as "bloc politics",

international alignments and realign

ments, new forms of diplomacy, and a host of others.
Needless to say, these political developments were accompanied
by and intermingled with the parallel integrational trends
in other disciplines,

especially the physical and military

sciences, communications and economics.

The overall result has been a truly earth shaking
"web" of developments, both within and between states,
which has caused staggering new formations and reformations
of political orders.

The existing post-war "science" of

political life became increasingly inadequate both as a
description and explanation of the new political forms
and activity, and especially as a methodology for encountering
and treating the new political phenomena.

Consequently, the

political scientists responded generously with new theories.
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new descriptions, new approaches, and new methodologies
as arms to analytically explain and control the "new
politics".

The political scientists' post-war arsenal

(which is still accumulating) is best characterized by
the new reinforcements with which he has allied himself —
the sociologist, the psychologist, and the economist
being of special importance.

With them th%y brought

theories, constructs, definitions, verbiage and methodologies,
both new and old, giving the new political science a
distinctively

eclectic and multi-variate trend which

shows no sign of fatigue.

Although my main task here is to establish the
theoretical basis and rationale for the model which I
have adopted, it will be useful to briefly scan the major
implications of the analytical and procedural equipment
which has been at the disposal of the post-war political
scientist.

Although this survey is not meant to be by

any means exhaustive,

I feel it is broad enough to blanket

the field generally and perhaps provide some contextual
meaning to the approach which I have chosen and help the
reader to more clearly identify the model relative to the
alternative choices which were available to me.

James C. Charleswor-bh, in the introduction to his

recent anthologyi provides what is perhaps the most
1.

J. C. Charlesworth (ed.). C ontemporary Political
is, (New York, **
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extensive nominal list of

"schools" of thought, both

historical and contemporary.

In addition, he categorizes

their approaches as either a "methodology" or as an "objective",
the significance of which I will examine shortly.

All in all,

Charlesworth runs the whole gamut of orientations, briefly
listing no fewer than thirty-six schools (or "sub"- schools)
of thought, from the allegorical, case method, and authori
tative revelational approaches of Plato, Aristotle, and
St. Thomas Acquinas (respectively), to the misodemic,
normativist and universalist orientations of the more
contemporary analysts.

What is particularly important to note here however,
is that at least sixteen of the twenty-six "methodologies"
most frequently inhabit the domain of the "behavioural
approach" in one form or another (e.g. the approaches of
decision-making,

the mathematical and metrical,

the structural-functional,

the empirical,

the systems, the eclectic, the

interdisciplinary, the residence-of-power, etc., etc.,).

Consequently,

the redundance and overlapping of

approaches and schools in Charlesworth's listing fails
to provide one with a meaningful systematization by which
one can pin-point his own approach without running in circles.
In my mind, in describing any "methodology" or "approach",
I feel it is best to distinguish between the unit (or
units) of analysis which comprise(s) the theoretical
substance of the approach on one hand, and the actual
treatment of raw material (data, norms, or whatever) on
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the other.

Quite clearly, both are "sine-qua-nons" of

the epistemological base of a complete approach, and are
in fact more rewarding than Charlesworth's categorization.
A very enlightening classification based upon this premise
is provided by Don Hartindale.p

Although Martindale is

primarily concerned with "functionalism", he develops it
in a rigorous, contextual setting, relating it to the other
major contemporary schools of thought.

With regard to the uhit(s) of analysis of an approach,
Martindale distinguishes between those that are "holistic"
(i.e. concerned with the totality of the environment
within which the phenomenon occurs, such as "system") and
those that are "elementary" (i.e. concerned with the smallest
possible basic element of the phenomenon,
"individual").

such as the

Quite clearly, there may be a plurality of

units of analysis as I will demonstrate later.

In fact one

of Heinz Ehlau's most enlightening contributions has been
the finding that there must necessarily be at least two
units of analysis:

a theoretical unit (such as a "group",

SvA"nation", or a "system") which provides the scope and
focal point of the enquiry and which comprises the conceptual
scheme or "model", and an "empirical" unit of analysis
(such as the individual man) which provides the focal point
of observation and raw material gathering.^ In carrying
2.

Don Martindale, "Functionalism in the Social Sciences"
in American Academy of Political and Social S c i e n c e ,
(Monograpn no. 5, 15657»

3.

Heinz Sulau,

in Charlesworth, op. c i t . , p. 36.
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this analysis one step further, it is quite clear to see
that the former represents what is termed "macro-theory"
and the latter,

"micro-theory".

Martindale*s framework also distinguishes between a
"positivist" treatment of data (following the methods of
the natural and physical sciences)
systematization.

and an "anti-positivistic"

The most significant forms of "anti-

positivistic" data treatment have been the "normativist",
the "formalist", the "existentialist" and the "sociological"
orientations.

Martindale ultimately arrives at a categorical frame
work which comprises a systematic combination of these
concepts.

The "positivistic elementarism" would be best

represented by the "behaviourists" (not to be confused with
"behaviouralist"), a school of thought conceived Ly
psychologist J. B. Watson and carried on presently by such
notables as B. M. Maclver,

F. S. Chapin, and Irving Coffman.

The combination of a "positivistic" treatment of data and a
"holistic" theory analysis however,

is representative of

such approaches as Marxism (as perpetuated by Ralph
Dahrendorf) and "Positive Organicism"
positivistic holism",

(G. B. Void).

"Anti-

indicating a concern for a non-rigorous

and sociological explanation of larger wholes,

is presently

dominated by the "sociological functionalists" such as
Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, and the work of C. Wright
Mills.

It is this group which is most often considered to
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be the leaders of the "behavioural" trend (defined below)*
The fourth combination,

that of "anti-positivistic elementarism",

is currently represented by such schools as the "Neo-Kantian
Formalists" (Werner Stark),

the "Phenomenological Sociolo

gists" (G. Gorvitch) and the "Existential Sociologists"
(Karl Jaspers).

Heedless to say, one could also further

subdivide these schools by introducing the terras "micro"
and "macro", e.g. Parsons and Merton could be considered as
"macro-functionalists", and Kurt Lewin and the Gestaltist
group as "micro-functionalists".

Robert Brown, although not as systematically or in
nearly the same depth, distinguishes between seven
"theoretical devices" (combining both holistic and elementary
units of analysis) in juxtaposition with varying forms of
data treatment .4

This type of division with regard to

approaches of study of political phenomena seems to be the
most widely recognized as well as the most comparatively
relevant.

I would now like to narrow down the generalizations
concerning different orientations to political study by
focusing more directly upon the approach labelled as
"behaviouralism", which encompasses the model which I have
employed in this paper.

4.

Following the framework above,

Robert R. Brown, E x planation in the Social Sciences,
(Chicago, 19637.
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the "behavioural" approach can be subdivided into theory
(units of analysis) and data treatment.

What is most

unique among the behaviouralists is their common committment
to a "scientific" treatment of data regardless of the
theoretical conceptual scheme employed.

With regard to

the latter however, there are as many "behaviouralisms"
as there are different combinations of theoretical units
of analysis.

This necessarily gives rise to perpetual

subdivisions within the behavioural school corresponding
to the holistic-elementarist, positivistic - anti-positivistic,
and macro-micro classifications described above.

The theory of "behaviouralism" is rooted in the prospects
of finding a science of general social behaviour which
would be modeled after the methodological
assumptions of the natural sciences.

(data treatment)

However, apart from

their common dedication to scientific treatment, behaviouralists have split on the search for the requisite, universal,
"fundamental units" or common variables of theoretical
analysis relating to human behaviour which would allow them
to make adequate generalizations or "laws" regarding social
activity.

It is in the latter respect that behaviouralists

have appeared disunited and confusing to the critical
observer.

"Behaviouralism" can thus be restated at this point

as the scientific method (of data treatment) combined
with a shift in emphasis to the substantive, qualitative
aspects of theory construction (i.e. units of analysis).
It is clear that the more specific, methodological,

and

scientific asoects of the current behaviouralist movement
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began in the 1920's; however, the uniquely "behavioural"
qualities: of the movement,

the theoretical aspects, did not

begin to catch up to the quantitative methodology until the
raid - 1950's, thus accounting for the currently erroneous
preoccupation of some viewers with the rigorous "behaviouristic" and quantitative aspects of behaviouralism.

Until the 1940's, Harold Lasswell carried the burden
of integrating behavioural theory with scientific empirical
research.
varied.

Now the theoretical applications are many and
David Easton is no doubt the leader of macro

analysis in the behavioural field, specializing in the
society-wide integrative "system" as the theoretical unit
of analysis .5

David Apter is most well known for his

"structural" orientation of behaviouralism.g Karl W.
Deutshh has focused upon Gommunication relationships as
the theoretical glue of political behaviour,y while Harry
Eckstein has adopted "authority patterns" as the key
conceptual framework.g

D. B. Truman's excellent treatment

of the "group" as the prime theoretical unit of analysis

5.

Eastona work in this field is covered by too many
publications to note here;: the bibliography lists
what are perhaps the most representative of the
selection.

6.

see D* Apter, The Politics of Moderni zation, (Chicago,
1965), e s p e cially pi IS 77., allhougE I do not agree
completely with his distinction between the "structural
approach" and "behavioural approach".

7.

see especially Deutch, The Nerves of Government,
(New York, 1965).
"

8.

The best and most concise treatment of this concept is
given in Eckstein's D ivision and Cohesion in D e m o c r a c y ,
especially chapters T, T T 7 T ~ a n d ~ X T I 7
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has been particularly influential on sociological interpre
tations.^

Max Weber and Talcott Parsons have conducted

profound behavioural studies employing the concept of "action"
as the theoretical cement of the epistemology of political
behaviour. 2Q

No less ambitious have been the multi-focal

unit attempts of Gabriel A. Almond, Sydney Verba, Lucian P y e ,
G. Bingham Powell,

Jr., and James S. Coleman to weave together

the theoretical constructs of "system",

"culture",

"function",

"structure", and "action" into a conceptual scheme for
comparative analysis and development r e s e a r c h . P e r h a p s
the most widely used and accredited theoretical and empirical
unit of analysis today however is that of the decision
making structure.

This behavioural focal point is particularly

prevalent in community studies (James Coleman),
relations and game theories (Morton Kaplan),

international

and voting

behaviour (Paul Lazarsfeld.)p2

Anthony Downs presents a decision making theory of
analysis which I feel is particularly applicable to the
East European communist environment and hence have employed

9.

see D. B. Truman, The Governmental P r o c e s s , (New York,

10. Fbr the most concise and clear account of Parsons'
"action theory", see Societies:
Evolutionary and
Comparative Perspect i v e s , (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,
Prentice-Rall; I966), especially pp. 5 - 9 and pp. 28 - 35.
11.

There are several good works by these theorists
concerning the multi-unit approach; the more pertinent
ones are listed in the bibliography.

12.

see especially Coleman's monograph Community Conflict
(New York, Free Press, 195?); Paul Lazarsfeld (et. â T . )
The Peo p l e 's Choice, (New York, Columbia, 1948); and
Morion""A. Kaplan^s^System and Process in International
Politics, (New York% W T l e y , I5577T especially pp. To5~’-244,
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it as the theoretical rationale for the model presented
in this paper.

It is a comprehensive,

socio-psychological

theory which focuses upon the concept of the "economic
rationality" of political actors, but yet is sufficiently
flexible to allow for its own integration with the structural
aspects of society as presented by the functional model.
In section "C" I will present the reasoning background
for this choice.

In the intervening section, I will

proceed to clarify and concretize the prerequisite concepts
of "behaviouralism",

"functionalism" and "model" as I will

be employing them in this paper.

B. THE FORM OF THE MODEL

Due to the abundance of constructs and theories
available the scientist has acquired the additional problem
of choice.

A wrong choice of "tools" may not only result

in the lack of any positive contribution to the science of
politics but may even result in the"loss of ground" by
adding new problems, or at least confusion,

to the area.

Conversely, a proper choice, one which is both quantitatively
and qualitatively consistent with the particular dilemma
which the scientist is to encounter, can be just as rewarding
as the improper choice is penalizing.

The subject of study in this text is the communist
governments of East Europe.

The comparative approach has

been chosen for several reasons.

Quantitatively, the
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plurality of the Eastern European governments alone justifies
some need, for comparison!

Although there is sufficient

political commoness between them to speak of all of them
generally as having certain attributes,

tendencies, and so

forth, they are in another respect like fingerprints;
although superficially the same at a glance, there are
many significant differences which can be detected and put
into focus only by the comparative microscope.

Qualitatively

the difference between the political processes of these
governments can best be perceived horizontally, comparing
basically similar "layers" of political activity existent
within each country's political process.

A "vertical"

comparison alone, compartimentalized country by country,
inevitably fails to be sufficiently analytically significant,
considering the intricacies of the modern phenomena.

My aim will be to show in the clearest possible terms,
the contemporary "de facto" workings of the overall political
systems of the communist East European communities.

Our

starting point will be with the "theory of the general
model", indicative and explanatory of the basic system
similarities between these countries.

To a certain degree,

it is intended to explain not only the basics of the systems
of government in communist East Europe, but of any contemporary
communist regime.

As will be outlined in the discussion of

the "general model",

there will also be some predictive

value of the theory,

in addition to the descriptive and

explanatory benefits.

This will perhaps be of considerable
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merit as a basis of determining actual political decisio&s
to be taken by these countries in the future.

More will

be said on this point in the concluding chapters.

The

selection of the horizontal-comparative approach however,
only gives one some direction,

some general alignment

between the starting point and the target.

There are many

possible roads by which one may venture in that direction
and more importantly perhaps, there are several types of
"vehicles" by which one may travel.

Thus there are equally

crucial procedural choices availabèè and decisions to be
made, all of which will have a direct effect upon the
validity and usefullness of the analysis to be rendered
and conclusions to be drawn..In other words, our inves
tigation will necessarily be circumscribed by the choice
of the new (and old) techniques, theories, approaches,

and

methodologies applied.

The general approach being comparative,

the particular

"path" or precise methodology will be decidedly "behavioural"
In addition, the "vehicle" chosen will be that of the
"functional model".

Altogether therefore, I will present

the analytical content in the form of the"general systems
theory" with a "behavioural" treatment of evidence.

As I have indicated in the previous section, the
behavioural movement is gaining unprecedented currency in
every social science field.

Due to the exemplary post-war

developments mentioned earlier, the activity of politics
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around the world has undergone phenomenal change while
the academic equipment of the political scientists has
remained relatively static.

Consequently, the post-war

years have witnessed some widening of the gap between the
rapidly changing dynamics of political behaviour on
every continent and the sluggish response of the orthodox
political means to accomodate it.

The conventional political science has consisted
essentially of the following characteristics:
1)

a legalistic orientation; a study of formal,

legal

structures, offices, and institutions;

2)

a stress upon what "ought to be" rather than
what "is";

3)

a normative approach,

professing primarily (moral)

value judgements;
4)

a pre-ocdupation with "offices'* and "authorities";
generally,

5)

a "compartimentalized" approach;

a stress upon "group" activity,

eg. cabinet,

legislature, etc., rather than individual activity.

The post-war development in political science,
culminating in the contemporary approach, contrasts the
pre-war "science" with the following corresponding ideas:
1)

an emphasis upon informal political structures
(such as pressure groups, religious associations,
etc.) in addition to the formal political structure;
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2)

a "de facto" orientation; what "is" the actual
political activity and how does the activity
manifest itself with relation to how it insti
tutionally "should";

5)

it attempts to be dispassionate, non-normative;
no idealistic solutions;

4)

it tends to become more multi-dimensional, adding
to the political dimension such disciplines as
economics,

5)

sociology, psychology, and anthropology;

it focuses upon individual activity (eg. of leaders),
as well as groups, whether formal or informal.

In addition to these basic orientations, David Easton
most cogently provides the contemporary scientist with the
more concrete assumptions and objectives of the behavioural
movement.

"Behaviouralism" assumes that political behaviour

provides the empirical scientist with regularities sufficiently generalizeable to have meaningful explanatory and
predictive results.

Therefore verification of hypotheses

by relevant human behaviour is a requisite goal.

Data

techniques, regardless of specific choice, must be structured
congruently with the problem, and not simply a haphazard
treatment of raw data.

Consequently, quantification has

no value "per se", but only where it is instrumental as an
aid to understanding and prediction.

Ethical evaluations

and moral judgements should be clearly separated from
Ip7

see 'Ï3 las tori, "ïhe Current Meaning of ’Behaviouralism’"
in Gharlesworth, (ed.), op. ci t . , pp. 11 - $1.
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academic and empirical value considerations.

Understanding

and explanations of the political phenomena considered
must precede all applications of theory toward solutions
to "de facto" social problems..Theory and scientific
research must be systematically combined, and not randomly
jungled, to be behaviourally relevant.

Finally, there

must be no "a priori" restrictions or impediments to inter
disciplinary integration;

social science, whether political

or other, deals with the whole human situation and cannot
ignore the relevant findings of other disciplines.

The above syndrome of tendencies, assumptions and
objectives best summarizes the concept of "behaviouralism"
which I intend to employ.

The basic idea is that behav

iouralism, both as a philosophic movement and a practical
methodology, is more than just what many of its critics
pretend, viz. a polite name to disguise the act of reintroducing the blatant rigors of the quantitative,
mathematical scientism through the back door.

Although

its form employs the scientific method (with the limitations
mentioned above) the approach derives the essence of its
"behaviouralness" from the theoretical search for stable
units for understanding human behaviour, e*g, in its
political aspects.

This then raises the question of the limitations of
behaviouralism.

There is such a vast amount of literature

concerning the "pros" and "cons" of this approach that there
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is neither adequate time.nor real purpose to enter into
this terrain here, which is quite another thesis.

I shall

therefore leave the detailed battle to such apologists as
Arnold Brecht, Harold Lasswell and Heinz lulau (for the
affirmative) and Dwight Waldo and Leo Strauss (for the
negative),

I do feel compelled however, in order to substantiate
the model 1 have chosen,

to provide a limited defence as

well as make clear to the reader certain important caveats
of behaviouralism.

As I have previously demonstrated,

there

are necessarily two levels of analysis with which the
behavioural scientist must contend:

the theoretical,

conceptual unit or scheme (eg. the "system"), and the
empirical unit,

the source of raw data.

The key to success

for this approach is to master the need to link behaviourally
relevant (political) theory with the theoretically relevant
behavioural data.

Where complex phenomena are involved,

complete success is hard to come

Quite clearly,

ultimate success in this regard is a function of the pro
gressive development of scientific techniques and the
increasing skills of the behavioural investigators.

Due to initial failures, polemicists have further
accused behaviouralists of being intellectually stubborn
for their failure to revert to the traditional, historical,
legal and normative approaches.

It is true that the more

conventional orientations seem to be here to stay, but it
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is my belief that the evidence suggests that one should not
remain solely with the analysis of the past, especially
since these older concepts are becoming increasingly
outdistanced by reality.

If today's social "science"

is ever to catch up with the complexities of modern phenomena,
the only way in my mind is through fresh, realistic experimentation.

While it is admitted that there is still

substantial value in a limited application of conventional
methods, such value will only decrease if the traditional
approaches insist on remaining isolated from the necessary
integration with the knowledge of other disciplines and
the fruits of the experimentation in a changed society.

Innevitably there arises the normativist concern for
the "value limitation" of the behavioural method.

And it is

a viable argument in the sense that the behavioural persuasion
does not and cannot deal, scientifically or otherwise,
ultimate, moral, primary value considerations.

with

The distinction,

quite clearly, rests between moral judgements on the
one hand, and academic or cognitive ones on the other.
Moral considerations such as "should variable

'x' have

greater power over the political system?", or "why is
democracy better than dictatorship?", or "should man be
able to control political phenomena?" all have no place in
behavioural science;
not scientists.

these matters are for philosophers,

Behaviouralism, because it does employ

the scientific methodology, can only concern itself with
the secondary,

"if...then" judgements.

If the behaviouralist
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can control the "if" situation (i.e. create the circumstances
necessary to make the "if" come true), then he can scientif
ically predict the resulting "then".

The fact that the

benefits of behavioural science do not include moral and
ethical Judgements does imat :ui nyr miu^ depreciate the
value of the approach, but rather only proves that behaviouralists are neither divine philosophers nor social
magicians.

A more serious limitation of behaviouralism rests
with the need for the integration of both "micro" and
"macro" levels of analysis.

As noted earlier, behavioural

scientists tend to specialize in one or the other.

Certainly

the behavioural methodology would be seriously suspect if
the micro-theories of Paul &azarsfeld (decision-making
and voting studies), D. B. Truman ("group" analysis) and
Morton Kaplan (decision-making and game theory) conflicted
with or at least could not be reconciled with the macrobehavioural products of David Easton, Gabriel Almond
and Harry Eckstein (general systems theory).

Obviously,

for all political phenomena to be favourably susceptible
to the behavioural approach, there must be reasonable
and satisfactory relationships linking "micro" and "macro"
analysis.

The behavioural scientist must be able to establish

a coherent bridging network between the individual,

the group,

the nation and the system.

Quite clearly,

this problem has not yet been solved;
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there has not yet been enough sophisticated research
within any one of these theoretical-unit fields, let
alone between them all.

However, advances are clearly being

made as more inhovative hypotheses and integrations are
tested, and the trend indicates that, notwithstanding a
high casualty rgte, the century will witness the uncont
ested superiority of the behavioural methods of social
investigation.

Yet 1 am convinced that this is the best methodology
currently available for the purposes of my study here,
namely, to explain as simply and realistically as possible
the "de facto" political decision making activity with
regard to the East European communist governments.
Considering the political phenomena to be studied here,
the approach to any treatment of them as they exist in a
communist state must almost of necessity be behavioural,
A non-behavioural (eg. institutional) study of communist
society would obviously lead the investigator astray —
analysing power institutions where no power exists, passing
out liberties to individuals and groups which do not in
fact have them, and occupying himself with legal frame
works which are but facades, masking the realities of
power.

There is too large a gap between the "legalities"

and the "actualities" in the communist state to employ
any method but a behavioural one.

The non-behavioural

methods would at least in part maintain the legal facade.
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What is required for a "de facto" study of the communist
political processes is, quite clearly, a "de facto"
methodology, and the behavioural approach is the best
weapon of attack in the arsenal of the contemporary
political scientist.

It should be noted however,

that the behavioural

approach, as I perceive it to be and also as I employ
it here, is not, nor should not be exclusive of the
conventional tools and methods of analysing political
science but rather inclusive of them, selecting the best
aspects from each, either singly or in combination, as the
analysis warrants.

The acceptance of the behavioural

methodology does not imply an outright rejection of conven
tional methods, but rather only that the more orthodox
procedures are inadequate in themselves and require
supplementation by a more realistically productive tech
nology of analysis.

Yet the "behavioural methodology" is just what it saysa methodology —

a means of treating data.

As noted pre

viously, this alone cannot satisfy the purpose since this
would only produce a rather awkward accumulation of inform
ation.

The data say nothing by themselves and there is

certainly no magic in the method of their collection.
The factual information must be accounted for meaningfully
by some theoretical construct, otherwise there is no
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particular significance attached to the data, they just
"hang in the air".

There can be no inductive generalization

made, no explanation given, nor any logical deductive reasoning promulgated by the data, until they have been given
substantial weight and analytical value by some theoretical
construct.

But once the theoretical element is added,

such

possibilities will then exist and the validity and usefullness
of the theoretical structure will be determined on its
merits by further testing, correcting and predicting.

Of the many theoretical approaches available to the
contemporary political scientist,

the one which I have

chosen to accomplish the above tasks in marriage with the
behavioural approach is that of "functionalism".
alism" (alias "structural functional analysis",
analysis",

"Function
"systems

"general systems theory") has its origins

primarily in sociology and anthropology, being associated
with such names as Emile Durkheim, A. R. Radcliffe - Brown
and Bronislaw Malinowski.

It has more recently been adopted

by other social sciences, most notably psychology and
political science.

Of the many "functionalists" practicing within the
political domain, Don Martindale provides what is perhaps
the most concise yet coherent work on the theory of
"functionalism".14

14,

Technically, he distinguishes between

Don Martindale, op. cit,

253964
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three types of functionalism in the social sciences.

Of

least significance is "eclectic" functionalism which
finds in the term simply another and equally relevant dimension to add to all of the others (power, authority,

etc.),

the addition of which brings the science a little closer
to reality; the nature of "function" in this regard is
understood to mean simply "purpose" or "objective".
Secondly,

there exists an "empirical functionalism" which,

although still regarding function as "purpose", considers
this dimension to be substantially more important than,
and central to, all other units of analysis.

Thirdly,

there is the prevailing concept of "structural functionalism"
which is the sense in which I employ it here.

"Structural

functionalism" places emphasis on the whole system as the
theoretical unit of analysis and thus becomes equated with
"general systems theory".

It is holistic in scope and

organicist and non-positivistic in its application based
upon the premise of establishing a whole new scientific
theory of politics.

Although I do not claim this

magnitude of success with its application in this paper,
I believe that such an achievement is well within the
realm of probability in future decades.

The best definition of (structural) functionalism
(or

systems theory) is that provided by Norton Kaplan
"...the study of a set of interrelated
variables, as distinguished from the
environment of the set, and of the ways
in which the set is maintained under
the impact of environmental disturbances...
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emphasizing
...the articulation of the
system of its components and the
behaviours by means of which it maintains
itself over time.M^s
This concept of functionalism clearly demonstrates the
application of specific environmental and multi-disciplinary
integration together with certain emphasis on sociological
theory.

Since the subject of my own theoretical analysis here
will be the scope of the national political system
within each of the countries of communist East Europe
(and among all of them generally),

the notion of "system"

as given by this definitional treatment is essential.

The

inclusion of the idea of interdependence between variables
is also requisite to the analysis since I feel that the
behavioural data supports this concept.

Yet I wish to make

it clear at the outset that although I intend to substantiate
certain basic linkage between variables in the system
through their behavioural interdependence, this does not mean
that every variable within the system must necessarily
exist in a cause - and - effect relationship with every
other variable.

I see no reason why this claim is especially

pertinent to the analysis or even should be made.

As a form of general behavioural theory,

(structural)

functionalism encounters much of the same critical difficulty

15.

Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory", in Gharlesworth,
op. cit., p. 150.
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discussed above.

The major problems with its application

rest with the functionalist's apparent failure to specify

and elaborate the precise nature of the interdependence
of particular variables as well as being unable to
adequately relate data on the empirical level to their
corresponding referents on the theoretical or "system"
level.

Quite clearly, as before, these difficulties will

only disappear in proportion to the advancement of behavioural
technology and skills.

More seriously perhaps is the shortcoming that is
difficult to determine precisely when a system is being
satisfactorily (or unsatisfactorily) maintained.
the objective, empirical criteria?

What are

Needless to say, the

first part of this problem smacks of moral considerations
and therefore is excluded from the behaviouralist scope.
Once this normative difficulty is solved however,

the

empirical criteria must be found, otherwise the usefulness
of the theory and the control over the system will be lost.
I can only say that if such indicators are not obvious
(and I think they are in the model which I present),
then further behavioural experimentation will be necessary,
perhaps employing theoretical units other than "system".

In contrast to these li mitations which I feel are in

no event insuperable,

the rewards of the functional approach

are substantially more apparent.

In studying the phenomena

of such a complex contemporary society, the systems
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approach sensitizes our analysis to the relevant and intricate
interrelationships and dynamics of modern social behaviour.
It draws attention to the whole social system as a setting
for political phenomena and thereby forces consideration
of the products and techniques of other disciplines,

in

addition to the new theoretical dimensions of "funcbion",
"activity? and "purposes" (whether of the "latent" or
"manifest" variety as theorized by R. K. Merton). 1$

More significantly still, the structural functional
construct together with the behavioural methodology,
has provided modern theorists with a fresh and infinitely
flexible framework for political analysis which could
conceivably account for and systematize every problematically
important political behaviour from that of the smallest
variable to that of the entire system.

At the moment

however, it is empirically impossible to test most of the
phenomena by such a holistic and non-positivistic approach.
This is the type of difficulty that both Parsons and Almond
have encountered;

they have attempted, by adopting an over-

ambitious set of conceptual units, to theorize about too
many phenomena ab too many different levels of analysis
simultaneously, without having an equally sophisticated
reservoir of techniques and skills at their disposal with
which to treat and meaningfully integrate all of the data
to verify their hypotheses.
16.

Nevertheless, the progressive

see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Stru cture ,
(Rev. edit.), (Glencoe^ 199777 especially~pp.~'SÜ~-“S2,
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"tools" indicates that even more complete and testable
analyses are imminent.

Having now established the basis for the application
of both "behaviouralism" and "functionalism",

something

must be said of the concept of "model".

The synthesis which I have created by the integration
of "behaviouralism" and "functionalism" is what may be
termed the "behavioural systems model".
in essence a "theory" or an "hypothesis".
just a theory;

The term "model" is
But it is not

it is a theoretical construct —

an aggregation

formulation, and integration of a set of ideas in such
a manner that together, in that particular pattern or
construct, they best explain what is intended to be investigated.
Therefore it is not simply a collection of ideas; a model
derives its "modelness" from the pattern or purposeful
integration and interrelationship of those ideas.

The more explicit purpose for the behavioural model
is best stated by Aviery Leisersoniiy
"For the normative theorist, it is
essential to establish satisfactory
purposive grounds on which sufficient
unity exists for the system to be
worth maintaining; for the empirical
theorist, it is necessary to explicate
a working model of political mechanics
or dynamics, whereby conflicting factual

17.

Aviery Leiserson, "Empirical Approaches to Democratic
theory", in 0. Garceau, Political Research and Political
Theory, (Cambridge, 19687, p7"'2D. ~
“
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requirements of constitutional belief
and social structure are reconciled in
a logically adequate explanation of
how... the political system...
survives as an effective political
enterprise."

Thus the "model" is essentially an explanatory
device which entails a patterning of variables and their
more or less logical relationships.

Also implied are

certain rules of interaction which, when the variables
are assigned given values (either quantitative or qualitative), the phenomenon under consideration would logically
result.

The theoretical model is therefore the spring-

board to "scientization" and the resulting predictive
rewards.

The validity and usefulness of the "model" for

purposes of understanding and control of political behaviour
will necessarily be a function of how accurately the
model variables correspond to the political realities; the
better the structural-functional "fit", the more precise and
innovative the predictive results will be.

The model may well take a diagramatic form (as it
will here) in addition to the abstract-verbal form.

In

the diagramatic model, each variable or element in the
visual conceptualization will have a clearly discernible
referent on the empirical l e v e l , thus interlocking the

research with the theory and providing a basis for
behavioural verification,

step by step.

The comparative

relationships which will be under inquiry can best be
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illustrated by a series of graphic models which represent
a microcosm of the workings of the political decision
making process in communist East Europe.

The model, both verbally and diagramatically, can
also be termed "interactive" (rather than "static") since
it is based upon the notion of functional interdependence
which carries with it the idea that the action of one
variable leads to the reaction or response by another.
It is this notion of "dynamic response" a "sine qua non"
of the model, which I intend to show is indicative of the
actual process of political decision making in the countries
concerned.

Furthermore,

I intend to show that the decision making

process under investigation is of a circular nature, and
that the process is continuous in the form of successive
"rounds" of decision making activity, each "round" consisting
of identifiable action and reaction within the environment
to political decisions being made in response to pressure
and alternatives both within and without the political
structure.

Yet each "round" is itself a response to the

previous round, and the variables fluctuate accordingly.
Hence in addition to the basic model outlining the "usual"
pattern of activity in each round of decision making,
there will be model variations explaining the trans
ition of the decision making process occasioned by the
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fluctuation of variables in successive rounds.

In effect,

the presentation will not be of the "static" two dimensional
type, but rather of the "dynamic" three dimensional variety.
Obviously, for explanatory purposes, the latter is much
more complete in form, and, 1 hope, in substance as well.
It should be remembered that this form of "dynamism" is
inherent in the concept of "functionalism" which I have
employed.

As Kaplan has illustrated (supra), functionalism

of the structural variety entails the maintenance of the
system variables "over a period of time".

As such, the

functional model, by its very nature, is especially
adaptive to and fruitful for comparative, dynamic analysis.

The model 1 have derived is the outcome of finding a
balance between two most important values in this type of
research, namely,

simplicity and sophistication.

Needless

to say, a simple model is more easily communicable than a
complex one; it also makes the behavioural task of selecting
and applying empirical evidence much less difficult.

Yet

it has the insurmountable drawback that it can rarely tell
us significant, new information of more complex political
phenomena.

On the other hand, a much more sophisticated

model which has a much greater potential for profound
innovations can rarely be practical or manageable for veri
fying its conclusions.

Consequently as in most things

political, a compromise must be struck between the two
extremes.
at hand,

For the purpose of the comparative investigation
1 believe that the model which is presented represents
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It is sufficiently simple to prevent the

anarchic confusion of the most comprehensive variety of
system, while simultaneously containing adequate sophis
tication to first of all explain more clearly and in a
more meaningful context, what we already know of the
communist systems of last Europe,

and secondly, give some

new insights into the workings of their decision making
mechanisms.

In addition,

I feel that every important

variable and definitional treatment is behaviourally
verifiable, and assumptions are minimized to those which
the discipline rarely challenges.

It is sincerely hoped

that the model is sufficiently "air tight" to withstand
the ever changing winds of political phenomena.

As is evident to the reader by now,

the model, by

virtue of the explanatory purposes for which it was
derived, will adopt a "macro-functional" scope, covering
each East European communist community at the national
system level.

The usual criticism of this scope is that it

is too large and unwieldly, necessitating a research effort
and verification scheme which is impossible with the present
impreciseness of the tools of the discipline.

Yet the

model, for all its scope, has surprisingly few variables.
This is not as inconsistent a development as at first may
appear.

Although the society-wide scope is the same, the

model is limited to portraying only the variables necessary
for the treatment of the national political decision making
process; it is not a model explanatory of every phenomenon
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of East European political life, although it is expected
that some light may be shed upon these others as well.
In other words,
phenomenon —
level —

the model focuses upon only one major

the decision making element at the national

and those attached phenomena directly related to

the process.

As will be shown however,

the verbal

explanations will of necessity go into more detail,
touching periodically upon other phenomena (eg. the socio
logical and psychological rammifications in East European
politics) which are less relevant to our specific analysis,

G. THE RATIONALE FOR THE MODEL

Although the theoretical unit of study and "scope"
of the model is the political decision making system at
the national level,

the empirical (or "micro") unit

of analysis will be a form of decision making itself.
It is not rare that in political models such as this
that "decision making" is both part of the methodology
and the explanatory objective at the same time.

Quite

clearly, as stated by Paul Driesing,ig
"All decisions...occur within a
decision structure of some sort,
but political decisions in
addition have
the preservation
and improvement of decision structures
as their special subject matter."

18.

Paul Driesing, Reason in Society...,

(Urbana, 1962) P. 198.
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This concept coincides with David Easton's "politics"
as "authoritative allocation of values" ( by decision
making), however Easton does not distinguish between
either public and private allocations or public and private
values.

Anthony Downs, in his decision making analysis of

political phenomena also equates public and private decision
making, as does Alfred Kuhn and Francis M. Bator.

The

significance of this union of public and private decision
making is that it enlarges the arena of political activity
while at the same time increasing the amount of observ
able "political" (decisional) behaviour.

Another reason for the employment of this empirical
unit of analysis is that the model most satisfactorily
accomodates the decision making rationale which serves
as a basic for the verbal explanation of the decision
making phenomena studied.

A preview of this line of

reasoning is warranted here before the introduction of
the model itself.

The behavioural approach, as valuable as it is for
our purposes of investigation,

is primarily a means of

accounting for descriptions and explanations of the
"what", the "how" and the "when" of political activity
in the most realistic terms; it is some times deficient
however, in the analysis of the "why".

Therefore the

specific theoretical rationale which I have added to
the basic behavioural system framework to assist in such
explanations is that of the "economic rationale".
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primarily in the form put forth in Anthony Downs, An
Economic Theory of Democracy.!a

The basic hypothesis of the economic rationale is
that just as corporations know their goals (e.g. profit)
and employ the most "reasonable" (efficient) means of
achieving them, so do political actors,

i.e. there are

specific, conscious goals of individuals while in their
roles as political actors and we can explain and to some
extent predict their political activity to achieve them.

The individual political actor, whether citizen or
ruler, necessarily entertains a hierarchy of preferences,
desires, and objectives,
importance to him.

in the rank order of their

Due to inherent selfish motivations

innate in every human actor, he will act politically by
selecting the political alternative which best satisfies
his utility stream or hierarchy of preferences.

Indeed,

for those political actors which to a significant degree
control the political activity of a state (e.g. chief
executives, party leaders,

etc.), the selfish desire

to possess and perpetuate this power is an economic incentive of its own.

This is especially true in states

where political power is concentrated in the hands of the
very few.

19.

Anthonv Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy,
(New iLrk, 19577:-------------------------------
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There are several important assumptions about this
hypothesis which should be realized at the outset.

First

of all, the hypothesis assumes a consistent,, intelligible
relationship between "goals" and "means".

Secondly,

there is an assumption of rationality itself on the
behalf of the political actor;

(does he always attempt

to choose the alternative which will maximize his return
per unit of cost?)

Thirdly,

there is the assumption

that all rational decision makers,

individuals in every

political capacity, exhibit the same qualities.

These assumptions certainly present theoretical
problems to be solved (such as the obvious irrationality
of some political activity).

There is also the investigator's

empirical problem of determining whether a decision taken
by a political actor is "rational" or not.

The actor

is supposedly rational because he makes political decisions
according to "benefit" and "utility" streams represented
by the ordered alternative decisions open to him.

All

human political actors, because of the fact that they are
human, are basically "selfish" and consequently will
consistently order their priority of choices such that
they will make the decision most beneficial for their
own purposes, regardless of the utility or disutility
involved for the society as a whole.

Downs does not satisfactorily eliminate the theo
retical problems inherent in his model and must subsequently
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recognize its limitations.

However, Downs'

applied to the Western democratic society.

theory was
There is

ample reason to suggest that the problems he encountered
were primarily the by-products of the democratic process
and not the theory.

In other words, I find that the

employment of the "economic rationale" is more justified
and more easily verifiable when applied to the model
of the communist decision making process.

The latter

application does not confront the investigator with such
difficulties as Downs encountered, and correspondingly
the rationale becomes much more valuable as an explanatory
and predictive device.

The evidence in support of this employment is overwhelming.

The economic rationale assumes a high correlation

between goals and means.

This is a much less imperfect

assumption in a communist regime since the number of
political actors is tremendously reduced (in the name of
"democratic centralism").

For this same reason, the

problem of irrationality (or "rational error") is
minimized; there are only a handful of individuals making
truly significant "rational" decisions at the national
level.

Furthermore,

the relatively fewer decision makers

in communist society are limited to policy decisions
which coincide (or can be "interpreted" to coincide)
with the much less flexible ideology to which the society
is committed.

Thus their scope of rational choice in

decision making is automatically less than their
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democratic counterparts since the areas of utility streams
are usually much more narrowly circumscribed by both ideol
ogical committments and long term "plans".

Resultingly,

the economic rationale has a higher probability of greater
explanatory and predictive strength in its communist
application than when applied to Western democracy.

It should be asserted quite clearly however, that in
any event this is not a serious limitation since decision
making theory makes no claim or demand for "rationality".
The assumption of rationality of a decision making person
or structure is an impossible one.

The most that can be

said is that leaders and decision makers have some priority
of values (whether rational or not, or even conscious or
not) and they make judgements in the light of their own
reasoning of the circumstances and alternatives.

"Game

theory" must assume rational actors but "decision theory"
does not.

The latter is empirical theory only and prohib

its the notion

of value judgement which is inherent in

the premise of

rationality.

This, in effect, is precisely why "decision theory"
fits so well into the structural-functional model.

To

theorize about decisions and actions which structural
variables may make rests not on the internal rationality
of the decision making unit, but rather on the external
examination and understanding of the environmental and
social stimuli (i.e. the other variables in the system
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and environment) which cause such decisions and actions
to he taken.

Quite clearly, as James Rosenau summarizes,go

"Processes located in the environment
toward which officials direct their
decisions are no less relevant than
those which occur in their minds and
interactions".

The "selfish interest" theme of the economic rationale
is also streamlined in its application.

Since there are

drastically fewer political decision makers of any signif
icance in the communist state, the impact of "selfish
interests" upon political decision making is concentrated
in a small minority.

In effect, the behavioural ability

bo trace, explain and predict is tremendously increased
since the investigator may legitimately concentrate upon
the handful of decision makers rather than attempt the
insurmountable task;

of achieving the same level of accuracy

in a pluralistic system where authority for significant
decision making is structured in a much more amorphous
arrangement of "power pockets"

which are for the most

part qualitatively distinct from one another.

In the communist state, on the other hand, all significant
decision making is effectively politically controlled and
centralized in the vej^f highest organs of the authoritative
structure.

In addition, despite the nominal plurality of

decision making organs in the communist society, the behavioural
20.

James N. Rosenau, "Premises of Decision Making Theory",
in Gharlesworth (ed.), o p. c i t . , p. 209.
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investigator need still only concern himself with applying
the "rationale" to a handful of individuals since invariably
there is a high degree of cross-membership in these organ
izations and subsequent interlocking of positions.

Thus

there are both quantative and qualitative advantages to
applying the "economic rationale" to the communist system,
especially for the behavioural investigator since the phenomena
involved in the decision making process can be covered
with adequate scope and depth without creating unmanageable
technical difficulties in assimilating and applying the
necessary empirical data.

One may well posit however,
"rationale",

that if, according to the

the political actor pursues his own selfish

interests at the expense of society, this "rationale"
cannot be applied to the communist state where, according
to ideology, one pursues the interest of society at the
expense of himself!
communist state?

But is this really true in the

Certainly the communist political actors

entertain at least a superficially different "selfishness"
(since they cannot personally possess untold amounts of money,
goods or other bourgeois accoutrements!) but they are still
human beings, and still "social animals", and therefore
still "selfish".

The communist ideology is one which denies

not the existence of selfishness, but rather the "free play"
of this selfishness as manifested by a free, or Western
democratic polity.

The communist citizen is not free to

be selfish, or at least not free to follow up any selfish
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inclinations.

The communist citizen, in effect, has nothing

to be truly and politically selfish about; he has surrendered
this priviledge to the handful of real decision makers who
make these decisions for him in order bhat the members of
the proletariat do not "destroy" themselves by pursuing
their selfish interests in a bourgeois fashion.

Therefore

the rational© is still applicable here.

I ftgl that this is sufficient evidence to warrant the
assertion that the "economic rationale" is considerably more
useful as an explanatory basis of political decision making
in the communist society than in Western democracy.

The

precise weight of this analytical advantage can only be
appreciated after a critical survey of the results obtainable
from the application of the comparative model which now
follows.
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PART II
THE MODEL
A. THE COMPONENTS OF THE GENERAL MODEL

Any comparative approach in political analysis should
commence at a point of basic ground common to all of the
countries under consideration,

such as the basic similarities

between them with regard to the particular phenomena
studied.

This allows the subsequent investigation with

regard to differences to proceed from as unbiased a point
of departure as is possible, thus illuminating much more
clearly the dissimilarities and variations in the political
activity subject to analysis.

The "general model" is

constructed to present such a common point of departure,
outlining the basic similarities generally inherent in
the decision making process of the communist societies
of Eastern Europe.

As pointed out in PART I, the "model" is based upon
the theory of functionalism, with the scope of the "general
system".

Dynamic in form and comparative in purpose, it

employs the rationale of the "economic theory" and the
methodology of behaviouralisii in the treatment of data
and analysis.

Since the functional model is essentially an explana
tory device, it is imperative that the mechanics of the
model maintain the three necessary properties for any
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functional explanation to be meaningful.

These properties

are ;
1)

a specific political phenomenon, or event;

2)

a delineation of the "system" within which the
event takes place (i.e. the boundaries);

5)

and the resulting effects upon the variables
within the system after the event has occurred.

With these properties in mind I will now begin to
set up the model.

At this point I will also become more

eclectic in approach, borrowing variables and ideas from
some of the leading names in this line of political
research, especially David Easton, Gabriel A. Almond,
and Sidney Verba.

Much of the terminology which has been

used by the model builders will be restated in terms
and applications which are felt to be more realistically
applicable to the model here.

In any case, although much

of the material has been used in models b e f o r e , the
specific form of the integration of these materials and
the explanatory devices accompanying them are born of
entirely original concepts.

This has had to be the case,

since to my knowledge, there has been no functionalbehavioural model devised to date which has had to cope
specifically with the phenomena concerned in the political
decision making process in the communist societies.

The "boundaries" of the system of political decision
making in the model will necessarily be, at the outset.
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the national society, since the analysis will be societywide and generalizable over the whole political system.
(Later in this section, the boundary will be enlarged to
include the necessary international variables).

Within

the societal boundary there will be some form of political
decision making process.

This "process" in its simplest

form will be termed the "input-output" concept as
represented in Diagram 1.

The societal boundaries in the diagram are self-evident.
The political system within those boundaries represents the
mechanics involved in the operations of the political
decision making process within the framework of the total
environment.

The political decision making structure is

that organizational unit within the political system which
has ultimate responsibility for decisions.

This structure

need not, as the empirical evidence will show, be the
formal government machinery, nor need it be even more than
one person, i.e. a dictator.

The input variable represents the combination of
"demands" and "supports".

"Demands" represent pressure

LgKm the decision making structure to promulgate certain
ideas as "outputs".

Demands are thus those "wants" which

exert enough pressure upon the system to force the decision
making structure to consider them as potential outputs.
The "wants" with which the model is concerned here are
those interests, desires, etc., which occur in the environment
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and which require some form of political action to give
them the status of "demands".

A "want" which cannot be

or is not "politicized" (transformed into a "demand")
remains simply a "frustrated want".

"Supports" represent the aggregate of actions, feelings,
beliefs, and attitudes within the environment which pre
dispose the environment to think, act, and feel beneficially
towards the political decision making system,

i.e. in ways

which tend to preserve and promote the system as it exists.
In a sense, the sum total of supports represents the degree
of "legitimacy" given to the system.

The "output" variable is simply the combination of
both authoritative and associative decisions promulgated
by the decision making structure.

Outputs of the "authori-

tative" variety are "direct action" statements, requiring
and enforcing the need and obligation for some positive
action (or non-action) on behalf of some or all members of
the society.

The failure to comply with the obligations

imposed by authoritative outputs results in the imposition
of penalties in the form of legal sanctions.

Outputs of

the "associative" variety on the other hand rarely have
such characteristics.

They usually take the form of

general policy pronouncements which are designed to influence
the "atmosphere" of the environment (e.g. to make the
environment more receptive to the authoritative outputs
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and to generate a certain degree of support for the programs
put forth).

The most conspicuous type of associative

output is that of the nature of "propaganda".

The distinction between authoritative and associative
outputs is extremely important analytically.

In a Western

democratic polity, the associative decisions and pronouncements
must of necessity precede the authoritative outputs —
the society must be generally amenable to the rationale
behind the authoritative output before they accept it as
legitimate.

If the decision making structure of the Western

democratic state attempts to promulgate and enforce
authoritative outputs (which legally bind the members of
society) without receiving either the overt or covert consent
of the environment, various elements within the environment
will react with hostility such that the existence of the
entire decision making process may be threatened.

In a communist state, although generally authoritative
outputs are preceded and supported by associative statements,
there are many significant occasions when the associative
output, if it comes at all, is promulgated long after the
more arbitrary authoritative output is given.

This is

particularly evident in those communist states where there
is a strong "Stalinist" orientation toward decision making.
In fact, there is substantial behavioural evidence to
support the contention that in many cases there is no
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associative output given at any time to justify or win
environmental support for the authoritative decision
taken.

In those communist states which are more "progressive"
(Roumania),

"independent" (Yugoslavia), or "liberal"

(Czechoslovakia,

January - August, 1968),

the reverse trend

is often the case, where nearly every authoritative
decision is proceeded by or at least made to co-incide
with, the associative output created to generate popular
support within the environment.

In addition to enabling the investigator to classify
outputs, the relationship between these two types of output
is particularly crucial when investigating political
activity with regard to "legitimacy" (especially whether the
resulting "supports" of the input variable are "legitimate"
or "forced"),

the feedback (and its resulting environmental

effects upon the system), and identifying sources of the
outputs themselves (e.g. whether they are occasioned by
inputs from the environment,

"withinputs" of the decision

making structure, or "international inputs").

More will

be said of these new factors as the model building progresses.

At the moment,

the explanation of Diagram 1 will be

complete with a brief discussion of the "feedback".

The

"feedback" variable represents the environmental response
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to the outputs of the decision making structure.

If the

outputs are "effective", i.e. if they satisfy the most
pressing wants and demands, or at least make the environment
perceive them to be satisfied (by successful associative
outputs), then the proportion of supports to demands (in
the input factor) will be relatively high, resulting in a
high degree of legitimacy accorded to the system which in
turn tends to preserve and give stability to the political
decision making process.

On the other hand, if outputs

are not effective or at least not perceived to be, then the
"feedback", or total environmental response, will produce a
redistribution of the "demand" and "support" elements of
the input variable resulting in an appropriate reduction
in the level of supports and a simultaneous and proportionate
increase in the level of wants and demands.

This overall process will be discussed at length and
in more detail in the more sophisticated forms of the model
which follow.

The point I wish to make here however,

is

that the role of the "feedback" in the model is a crucial
one.

It is the "feedback" which gives the decision making

process the characteristic circularity which was discussed
in the previous section.

In the model drawn however,

the

feedback arrow is simply a diagramatic device to portray
this circularity.

In reality,

the outputs permeate some

elements of the environment immediately upon their release
from the decision making structure,

in which case the
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feedback response begins immediately.

Other elements in

the environment may not be affected by the outputs until
much later (or even not at all) and thus not generate a
feedback response affecting the input variable until a
much later date (or not at all).

Thus, analytically,

there

is no co-ordinated, homogeneous feedback response as the
arrow may suggest.

Behavioural evidence in all of the

last European countries indicates that such response is
inevitably diversified in time, origin, content, and strength,
Thus the feedback mechanism operates as a type of clearing
house, weighing,

sifting, and counter-balancing these

diversified responses to outputs in the environment,

and

presents a "net" demand - support combination which becomes
the new input variable.

There may be considerable dissatis

faction with some authoritative outputs, however this may
be counterbalanced or erased by a proportionate increase
in supports due to the success of some associative outputs
promulgated at the same time.

The "net" effect in the

environment will then be practically nil.

Before proceeding further to the more advanced model,
a more detailed discussion of the decision making structure
is warranted.

Diagram 2. presents a close-up of the typical

political decision making structure in the communist states
of Eastern Europe.

This structure has been previously

defined as "that organizational unit within the system
which has ultimate responsibility for outputs".

The
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behavioural evidence put forth in the following chapters
will significantly substantiate the contention that this
"structure" is almost invariably synonymous with the
politburo of the communist party, or at least the core
group of the most influential members in it*

What is

important to realize is that it is not the "structure"
or the "politburo" itself which is important, but rather
the influential members which comprise it.

Perhaps the most

striking differences between the communist political system
and that of the Western democracy is that in the former,
decision making power is invested (at least "de facto")
in men, not offices.

Consequently, for the purpose of

the model, political power follows the man, not the structure,
no matter how formal or legal the latter may be.

Therefore,

although diagramatic convenience requires something which
resembles an official structure, it must be realized that
analytically this is not necessarily the case.

Again, as

behavioural evidence in the following chapters will
indicate, the organizational unit represented by the
"decision making structure" often is?in fact a small,
informal group of men, usually dominated by one among
them.

The point is that the decision making power is

derived from the personalities involved, not the organizational characteristics of the structure.

It is not my intention to give evidence on behalf of
this hypothesis here but rather to point out two important
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features of the decision making structure in the model, as
applied to the last European communist state.

The first

feature is the possible treatment of the "demands" of the
input variable which are considered by the decision making
structure as potential outputs.

As "demand one" (Dl)

indicates, a demand may be readily transformed into an
output without significant modification.

As an alternative,

a number of demands may be grouped together (D 2, 5, 4,)
and with some alteration eventually become an output factor.
As D 5> 6, 7, 8, indicates however, a grouping of demands
may take place in the form of a potential output and be
pushed part way through the conversion process only to be
killed before actually becoming an output,

"D 9" represents

the situation where a demand may be seriously considered
however must be "split" for some reason or another,
resulting in the formation of several potential outputs
deriving from one demand.

As in the previous case however,

any number of these split demands may be "killed" before
becoming an output.

The previous discussion concerning

"authoritative" outputs gives more theoretical credence
to this type of activity, since different aspects of demand
may be required to serve both authoritative and associative
purposes.

Finally, D 10, D 11, and D 12 are indicative of

the situation where a number of single demands may be
entertained for a period of time before being dropped (D 10),
may be killed after some initial consideration (D 11), or
simply ignored from the outset (D 12),
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The transformation of demands into outputs is selfexplanatory with regard to demonstrating the circularity
of which I spoke earlier.

However,

the "killing" of

demands within the decision making structure seemingly
contradicts the principle of the circular process and
requires further discussion.

If a demand (or demand

"group") is terminated at this point, there may be no further
concern with it by the decision making structure, which
probably feels that a "non-output" of this nature would
not have serious effects upon the environment.

In this

case the circularity for that particular input has ended and
the "linkage" process has stopped.

If the decision making

structure is that which appears in the "Stalinist" type
of state, then this structure may be more inclined to this
type of response to demands (i.e. a "non-output response"),
relying upon force to handle any serious environmental
reaction to the "non-outputs".

On the other hand, the

more "liberal" type of regime which relies more heavily
upon legitimate environmental support and avoids the use
of force wherever possible, will tend to ignore only demands
of minor consequence.

In addition,

the "liberal" decision

making body will be more inclined to replace the ignored
demand with one of its own, by creating an "associative"
(propaganda) output to relieve the potential adverse
environmental response to the "non-(authoritative) output".
Thus if a demand is killed within a decision making structure,
this need not represent a "non-influence" upon this group.
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In fact there is sufficient behavioural evidence in most
all of Eastern European communist communities to support the
hypothesis that if a sufficiently important demand from the
environment is not to become an output (e.g. the demand
for increased production and distribution of consumer
goods), this "killed" potential output (authoritative) will
be replaced by an associative output designed to compensate
the environment for the non-satisfaction of its demand.
This brings me to the second important element to be
discussed with regard to the decision making structure,
the "withinput" factor ("W").

Since no decision making structure in any form of
government, be it communist, democratic, or otherwise, can
satisfy all of the demands upon it, there will always be
some form of "demand killing" such as the one described
above.

However, what is truly distinctive and unique to

the totalitarian state is the tremendous significance of
the "withinput" factor associated with "demand killing",
Â "withinput" is of essentially the same character as the
"input", however it has its origins somewhere within the
decision making structure itself.

The "support" element

however, can usually be taken for granted, since it can
be assumed that the existing regime gives utmost support
to itself and its system of decision making.

Frequent

purges within and without the decision making structure
have the purpose of guaranteeing a satisfactory degree
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of homogeniety in this regard.

Of more crucial analytical

value is the demand aspect of the withinput.

As noted earlier, many an authoritative output will
be paralleled by an associative output to assist in its
implementation.

Host of the important authoritative outputs

will necessarily be derived from withinputs (e.g. the long
term "plans",

"co-operatives",

foreign policies, etc.),

with relatively little regard given to the desires or
influences of the environment.

This, of course,

is

practically a definition of the totalitarian system of
government and one of its basic features.

Yet on the other

hand, even the most totalitarian of states must give some
recognition, albeit infrequent,
to the environment,

imperfect, and indirect,

since this is in the best interests

of the decision making group, namely to maintain and
promote its own power.

Consequently,

"withinputs" will

also result in associative outputs designed to assist in the
proper administration of authoritative outputs (whether
originating from inputs or withinputs), or to placate
those dissatisfied elements of the environment which are
subject to "non-outputs" as discussed above.

It should also be noted that the "withinput" demand
is more often successful than the "input" demand in
becoming an output, since it is originated by the decision
making structure itself.

It undoubtedly occurs however.
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that one or more members of the decision making group
will have his own demands "killed" during this process.
The withinputs represented in Diagram 3 do not reflect
this since for the purposes of the model at this stage,
a perfectly homogeneous decision making group is assumed.gi

In summary then, by far the most important type of
"demand" in the communist system is that of the "withinput"
variety.

It has a much better chance of being promulgated

as an output, which is a noteable feature of "democratic
centralism" in the communist decision making process.
In addition, it may well be a response to a "killed"
demand from the environment, as well as being born solely
within the decision making structure itself.

At this point, we are now ready to proceed with the
more complex model.

B. THE DYNAMICS OP THE GENERAL MODEL - EQUILIBRIUM STATE

Diagram 3 represents the model approximating the
"equilibrium" position.

Although it may seem that the

model is totally different than that of Diagram 1, the
basic input - output principle is the same.
21,

Diagram 1,

Beginning with the non-equilibrium stage (Diagram 4(b)),
this assumption is no longer valid and demands arising
from the withinput variable are in fact "killed".
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in all of its simplicity,

served the function of explaining

the basic, circuitous principle involved in the decision
making process.

Diagram j? is a sophistication of that

process which is intended to portray the more subtle
characteristics of a particular type of decision making,
that found in communist East Europe.

The societal boundary lines have been removed to
avoid confusion;

the reader must still assume that this

model is of a national,
process.

society-wide decision making

The decision making structure is identical to

that just discussed (Diagram 2).

The output factor

however, takes on a new dimension here, becoming the
"output area".

This has been necessary in order to

indicate variations in communist party initiative and
control over the implementation of outputs.
the output area,

The larger

the more extensive the party control,

both quantitatively and qualitatively; the smaller the
area, the more lax are the party controls at every level
of the environment to be affected by the outputs concerned.

The feedback line is again simply a diagramatic device
to demonstrate the interaction and linkage between outputs
and inputs.

Analytically,

entire environment.

the output area covers the

Similarly, the "stress area" represents

the entire environmental response to the output combination
at that particular "round" of decision making activity.
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In effect, it represents the result of the feedback^
"clearing house" operations discussed earlier.

The

"stress area" (or "environmental pressure area") reflects
the correlation between "potential demands" and "supports";
the greater the level of"supports" compared to the level
of "potential demands" (i.e.

"wants"), the smaller the

stress factor will be; conversely, the greater the level of
potential demands as compared to the level of supports,
the larger the "stress area" will be.

At this point, a new distinction must be made.

Behavioural

research necessitates a restatement of "demands" within the
environment, which hitherto (Diagram 1) included all wants,
desires, objectives, etc., upon the

assumption that they all

have significant influence upon the

decision making

structure.

the case.

Empirically this is not

especially in the communist state,

Most "wants",

simply exhibit nothing

which even approximates direct influence upon the decision
making structure while in the form of individual wants or
even groups of wants.

This is because they fail to become

"politicized", or considered as potential outputs by the
decision making structure.

The model here of course is interested only in
"demands" at the national level.

It is certainly true

that "wants" may become "politicized" and satisfied by
decision makers on lower, more local levels, especially
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when the "wants" are of comparatively little significance.
This is the case, since on a much more minor scale there
are "decision making structures" of a type at every level
of society, especially in the form of communist party
organizations which permeabe and parallel each and every
stratum of the environment.

Yet even if such "wants"

are politically chanelled upward at local levels, they may
be rejected at any higher stage and fail to become
"demands", which are defined as "politicized wants" which
have a substantially direct influence upon the national
decision making structure in so far as they are considered
as nationally determined "potential outputs".

Therefore,

previous to becoming "demands" within the national context
of the model,

"wants" only have the status of "potential"

demands; if and when they fail to become demands (or if
the demands are killed in some decision making structure),
they remain simply "frustrated" wants.

Two points must be clarified however.

I mentioned

above that "non-politicized wants" (potential demands)
have no direct influence by themselves upon the decision
making structure.

Yet at the same time, the model contends

that they are instrumental for the all-important "stress
area".

The paradox arises from the confusion between

"direct" and "indirect" influence upon the decision
making structure.

Directly,

"wants" can rarely influence

the national decision making structure in a communist
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state, since there is no mechanism provided for the
mobilization and politicization of "wants", apart from the
party hierarchy.

(Indeed,

it is within the very definition

of "communist party" that it discourages such independent
political activity.)
case.

However,

indirectly this is not the

As the following chapters will point out, I believe

that there is ample behavioural evidence to confirm the
hypothesis that due to the dissatisfaction resulting from
this lack of political effectiveness of environmental
wants, considerable "support" for the system is withdrawn,
while simultaneously the quantity and strength of the "wants"
increase, creating a larger "stress area" for the next
round.

This phenomenon assumes of course,

that any substi

tute outputs, especially of the "associative" or "propaganda"
nature, are innefféctive.

The dynamics of this process

will be elaborated later.

The second point to be clarified is that which concerns
the decision makers at the lower party levels within the
environment.

As already pointed out, the hierarchical

arrangement of the communist party necessitates some
decision making of a political nature at every level.
Since some communist party organization exists as an "alter
ego" of every significant environmental group, whether
formal or informal, the party organization is the most
significant "aggregator" of wants; it provides the mechanics
for synthesizing and grouping of selected wants and
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interests within the environment.

Necessarily,

in a

totalitarian system, this same organization must provide
for the controls over the "articulation" of these wants.
For the purpose of the model here, interest or want
"articulation" is defined as the conversion of a "want"
into a "demand", or, in effect, politicizing a particular
"aggregated want" which is believed by the lower level
decision making structures to be of "potential output"
significance.

Those party "representatives" or decision makers
within the environment who decide which of the particular
"wants" which are aggregated and filtered upward through
the party hierarchy are to ultimately become "demands"
upon the national decision making structure, are the

The "gates" are an extremely significant variable in
the communist decision making process.

As the diagram

indicates, as the analysis suggests, and as the behavioural
data verify,

the "gates" present themselves as a barrier

through which the environmental influences must get in
order to be politically effective.

The "gates" show that

such influences from the environment do not automatically,
or even with moderate difficulty, reach the decision
making structure.

Whereas there are institutional

mechanisms, both formal and informal, guaranteed by the
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Western democratic system to assist and protect the
legitimate political expression of environmental "wants",
the reverse is the case in the communist state.

The

"gates" have the prime function of preventing such
influences from making their weight felt upon the ultimate
political decision making body.

The "gatekeepers", being

trustworthy, dedicated personnel well versed in the
requisites of communist decision making, man the "gates"
which screen most all potential demands which reach that
level, to determine what political weight is to be
accorded them.

With regard to the environment, these

party functionaries largely monopolize the power of
politicization.

Any "want" from either the party or non-

party environment which a "gatekeeper" articulates, becomes
a "demand" directly upon the decision making structure.
Exactly who these individuals are, what offices they
occupy, and what authority they possess, are questions
which I will leave for the following chapters, where a
more behaviourally rigorous and comparative analysis is
convenient.

The "gates" are plural, representative of the many areas
of decision making at the national level for which "potential
demands" must be screened.

At any one time, certain gates

among them may be "open" in which case non-party interest
aggregators within the environment (e.g. church hierarchy,
leaders of youth groups, etc.,) may have direct influence
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upon the decision making structure ("v",

”w",

"x", "y", "z").

In this case,these "aggregators" become their own
"articulators" and are able to transform their "wants"
into political demands (at the national level) without the
difficulty of being screened by the party "gatekeepers".
This type of activity is rare in most communist countries,
however it is not infrequent in the more "liberal" regimes
(e.g. Czechoslovakia, January -August, 1968).

This

latter example represented the situation where the
decision making structure may authorize certain gates to
be left open, and in effect,

invite direct politicization

of wants from and by the environment.
direct articulation however,

Another type of

is that whereby an environmental

factor (such as the church hierarchy In Poland) is able to
either "force" its way through the gates (by arousing
enough environmental support) or has enough influence on
its own to somehow get by the gates, despite the gatekeepers'
efforts to prevent such influence.

Tbere is a definite relationship between the "stress
area" and the "gates".

In a Western democracy, wants are

politicized much more directly, as pointed out above,
since there is no substantial "gatekeeping" activity
performed,

and in so far as there are some barriers to

more direct political influence, there are many legal and
effective ways to circumvent them (e.g. mass demonstration,
press publicity, etc.)

Since wants can most always be
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politicized in Western democracy, then for all intents
and purposes they can be equated with "political demands".
Since

the"gates" of the communist system are set up to

prevent this, there is a tremendous number of "nonpoliticized wants" within the communist environment.

To

the extent that the outputs of the decision making structure
are ineffective in one "round" (i.e. do not satisfy the
major wants and fail to appease the environment in any
other way), the supports for the system will decrease while
the non-politicized wants tend to become at least qualitat
ively stronger and eventually, quantitatively more abundant,
resulting in a corresponding increase in environmental
stress.

If these activities prevail over successive

"rounds" of the decision making process, the stress area
will build up against the gates.

Thus the pressure build

up in the environment, although initially an adverse
response to ineffective outputs,

is also the result of

the function of t h e % a t e s " to shield the decision making
structure from the environment and prevent any "seepage"
of environmental pressure toward the decision making
structure.

In effect, although the "gates" are designed

to protect the decision making structure from the societal
stress, they can, under certain circumstances, produce the
opposite result.

This situation will be analysed later in

considerable detail, with the operation of the model in the
"third dimension".

Once the environmental wants are articulated by the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
gatekeepers,

tbey become politicized at the highest level,

and, by definition,

are considered as potential outputs

by the decision making structure, after having been funelled
through the "boundary threshold" to reach this small group
of political actors.

The "threshold" variable is the

last element in the circular linkage of the decision making
system and it is to a discussion of this element that I
now turn.

The "boundary threshold" represents the distance
between the decision making structure and the "gates"
within the environment.

This "distance" in the theoretical

model is indicative of two necessarily related phenomena
on the empirical level.

First,

it shows the "tightness"

(more orthodox) or "slackness" (liberalness) of control
which is exercised by the decision making structure over
the party and non-party elements in the environment with
regard to inputs.

When more strict and centralized

control is deemed necessary by the decision making structure,
this "distance" is substantially shortened;

the more

"liberal" and decentralized the control, the threshold
distance is lengthened.

These changes occur over a period

of many "rounds" of decision making activity however;
therefore I will elaborate upon the threshold activity
further with the presentation of the three dimensional
model.

The second and interdependently related aspect of the
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"threshold distance" is the corresponding gate activity.

If

the threshold distance is relatively great, indicating a
more slack and decentralized control over the environmental
inputs by a more liberal-oriented regime,

this necessarily

infers more open gates and more direct environmental
influence upon the decision making structure.

Conversely,

in the case of a more orthodox, highly centralized "watch
dog" control over environmental inputs, which is indicative
of the more "Stalinist" type of regime, the situation will
be "up tight", with a very short threshold distance, and
the gates will tend to be closed,
environmental influence.

tightly locking out

These situations also bear a

definite relationship with the size of the "output area",
since the relative environmental control exercised by
the decision making structure in response to the input
variable must be consistent with the administrative control
and enforcement of the outputs.

This is particularly significant when considering the
time element associated with the decision making.

The

shorter the threshold distance and, correspondingly, the
greater the degree of gate closure, the less time the
decision making structure will have to make effective
decisions to prevent a pressure area from building up.
On the other hand,

if the threshold distance is relatively

great and the gates are "liberally" open, then the decision
making structure will have more time with which to pro
duce effective output combinations.

This is the case.
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since, for example, in the latter situation the environment
is exercising considerably more direct influence upon the
decision making structure, and in a sense, the open gates
allow pressure from the environment to dissipate.
extent,

To this

the openness of gates represents a "safety valve"

factor in the system, a means of partial control over the
environmental pressure area.

Furthermore, many of the

environmental demands upon the decision making structure
will be contradictory or mutually exclusive.

This allows

the decision making structure to legitimately stall
certain output combinations since the environment has not
generated homogeneous support for such demands.

The

environment, in turn, will be hesitant to create an increase
in pressure since the source of the non-satisfied demands
(ambivalence) is within the environment itself, not the
decision making structure.

Such are the basic variables of the general "equilibrium" model of decision making on the national scale in
communist East Europe.

Now it is time to consider these

variables together in linkage motion, and add the third
dimension, the temporal element.

The functional interactions

rarely produce a 1:1 relationship between the interdependent
variables concerned.

Thus the state of "equilibrium" is

more mythical and theoretical than actual and empirical.
Consequently, the basic input - output mechanism is
rarely balanced and the actions and reactions of variables
are constantly in a state of flux.

Thus only the "third
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dimension",

that of successive "rounds" of decision

making activity over a period of time, can give a
realistic interpretation of the dynamics of the model.

During this "analysis in motion" however, it should
also be kept in mind that the decision making structure
is the "lock" which holds all the links of the functional
chain together in circular form.

Especially in the

totalitarian state, where the key to power is in the
hands of a uniquely omnipotent decision making group, this
analogy obtains special significance.

By the very concept

of totalitarian power, the decision making structure can
to a certain degree make or break any link in the chain.

C. THE MUDEL IN THE THIRD DIMENSION

Let us take as our starting point what I consider
to be the "state of equilibrium" of the general model as
represented in Diagram 3»

In the state of equilibrium,

the combination of authoritative and associative outputs is
sufficiently effective to satisfy the environment such that
the proportion of potential demands relative to supports does
not change (i.e. the stress area remains stable).

In

addition, the gate activity remains similar to the previous
round and the threshold distance is neither increased
nor decreased substantially.

Consequently, the equilibrium

position presents a rather "static" round of decision
making activity.

There are very few changes since every
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disbalancing tendency is equally offset by a counter
balancing action.

For example,

if certain demands from the

environment are "killed" in the decision making structure,
the potential effect upon the stress area of this "non
output" may be offset by a successful associative output
which is substituted by the decision making structure ;
consequently,

the decrease in system "supports" (in the

environment), caused by the non-outputs frustration of
wants, is restored by the associative output(s) designed
to counterbalance the adverse effects.

Since the stress

area remains the same as in the previous round and assuming
that the aims and attitudes of the decision making structure
remain constant,

there is no reason to change either the

gate activity or the threshold distance.

Such is the

theoretical state of "equilibrium".

For purposes of analysis and demonstration of the
third dimension however,

I will introduce into this

equilibrium position of the model a more realistic catalyst.
After successive hypothetical "rounds" of equilibrium
activity, let us suppose that the combination of outputs,
both associative and authoritative, are generally ineffective
or at least perceived to be so by the environment.

In

this first round of ineffective outputs (Diagram 4(a)),
the environmental stress area will tend to expand slightly
due to the initial adverse feedback response to such
ineffectiveness.

The balance of supports and potential

demands is upset in the letter's favour.

Since the
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"stress area" is crucial here,

it must be stated now

that the behavioural evidence suggests that crisis proportions are not reached until after several successive
rounds of output ineffectiveness, both quantitative and
qualitative, followed by corresponding "de facto" changes
in pressure area build-up.

This is due to the built-in

"structural lag" in the workings of this aspect of the
decision making process.

As pointed out earlier, there

is no (xtensive network of facilities available in the
communist environment which promotes and encourages the
effective politicization of dissatisfaction, as there
exists in Western democracy.

On the contrary,

the structure

of the system is such that organized environmental influence
is deliberately discouraged.

The "alter ego" party

organizations paralleling every significant group at every
societal level, effectively prevent any form of organized
pressure from occurring.

Similarly, within the party,

each level of party organization is surveying and criti
cizing the one below to prevent any such "reactionary"
activity.

Thus both horizontally and vertically,

independent

environmental pressure is systematically thwarted,
Resultingly,

it usually takes several "rounds" of ineffec-

tive decision making in the communist system before the
pressure area is large enough and strong enough to overcome
these structural barriers to the political expression of
environmental dissatisfaction.

Therefore, although the pressure area may increase
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slightly in the first round of ineffective outputs, there
will be no other significant changes.

If second and third

rounds of decision making fail to satisfy the environments
major demands however, there will be severe digressions
from the equilibrium state, characterized by the growing
pressure area, closing of the gates, tightening of party
control over the input variable (reducing the threshold'
distance), proportionate increase in the "withinput"
factor over the "input" factor from the environment, and a
more strict administration of outputs,

i.e. a larger

output area (Diagram 4(b)).

A careful analysis, step by step, is warranted here.
Since third round outputs were again decidedly ineffective,
the growing level of expressed dissatisfaction in the
environment is catching up with the successive rounds of
ineffectiveness, and is expressed by the significant growth
in potential demands and proportionate shrinkage of supports.
The reaction of the decision making structure to this
adverse growth of environmental pressure must necessarily
include a further closing of the gates to protect their
own power position.

At the same time, the boundary threshold

will be drawn closer; party control over the society will
have to be more strict to keep the environmental pressures
from errupting.

Necessarily of course,

if the previous direct

environmental influence is curtailed by the closing
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activity of the gates, there will be less significant
input factor from the environment (only "x" and "z")
and both the number and proportion of withinputs to inputs
will increase.

Another reason for this is the tendency

of the decision making structure to increase outputs in
hope of alleviating some of the environmental pressure.
In addition,

to give the outputs the best chance of

reducing this pressure in the environment, the party
bureaucracy and administrative organization will have to
implement these outputs with decidedly more control to
achieve more effectiveness.

Thus the output area will

also increase both quantitatively and qualitatively,

to

control more effectively the administration of those
outputs so that maximum value can be obtained therefrom.

This enlarged output area however, is the beginning
of round four,

let us again assume that the output

combination is generally ineffective,

in which case all of

the adverse trends in round two and three are strengthened.
Diagram 4(c) indicates the functional variations which
have occurred due to further ineffective rounds of decision
making (R4,

H6).

The proportion of potential demands

to supports is about as high as it can get.

(There will

always be some supports for the system, especially of
the "old guard loyalty" variety).
reaches crisis proportions.

Thus the "stress area"

The gates will be closed

solidly and the threshold distance will be as short as
possible.

Consequently, party control over environmental
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-

influences will be as tight and rigorous as can be.
There will still be demands from the environment, but they
will be as a result of the growing pressure area and will
be cautiously filtered by the party and articulated only
by the "gatekeepers".

Behavioural evidence suggests that

this situation is also characterized by a certain distrust
in the party decision making structure.

Consequently,

some or all members of the decision making structure may
even become the

"gatekeepers" themselves.

The disbalancing "snowball" movement should now be
apparent.

One adverse reaction feeds another.

The in-

effective output combination assists the growth of the
pressure area, which in turn promotes gate closing activity
(just when they should be left open to relieve the
pressure).

This in turn justifies a further tightening

of party controls (over inputs) which warrants a proportionate increment of withinputs resulting in an increase
and stronger enforcement of outputs which are disadvantaged
to begin with in a more hostile environment.

Thus it can

be readily seen that there seems to be lacking any inherent
structural balancing mechanisms as there exist in the
Western Democratic process.

The decision making structure at this point is in
trouble.

The job of the decision making structure is to

make decisions,

in effect,

to govern.

No government can

exist for long, no matter how totalitarian,

if it continues
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to render ineffective decisions, decisions which do not
solve problems but only feed them.

The "stress feedback"

snowballs and over a number of rounds the system approaches
the structural explosion point.

Let us assume however,

that the system does not explode,

but rather that the decision making structure at round
seven manages to come up with an output combination
which begins to satisfy many of the environmental "wants"
which have accumulated over the previous six rounds.
This may have little immediate effect upon the stress
area since the lagged dissatisfaction from rounds five
and six may just be "catching up" at this point and making
their weight felt.

Also, if the period of prolonged

dissatisfaction was considerably lengthy, the environment
will not usually respond more favourably at the outset.
After all, party controls and environmental suppression
are still exercised within the environment to a large
degree at this point.

There may be therefore a certain

element of environmental distrust toward the system, or
at least a "wait-and-see" attitude.

Nevertheless, the time lag in the environmental
response to satisfactory or effective outputs should be
shorter than the lag in registering the adverse response.
This seems to be true since there are specific structures
and procedures built into the administrative machinery to
promote and encourage the satisfaction of outputs within
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the environment.

As much as environmental dissatisfaction

of and participation in decision making is discouraged by
the system, acceptance of and satisfaction with the
outputs, once they are promulgated, are stronly encouraged.
Thus the "satisfaction lag" will in fact usually be considerably shorter than the "dissatisfaction lag".

Assuming that an effective output combination is
forthcoming in round eight,

some ameliorating tendencies

may then begin to show, as demonstrated by Diagram 5(a),
In this situation,

the reverse influences are apparent.

The effectiveness of the output combination will generate
a favourable "feedback balance" in which the adverse
proportion of potential demands to the level of supports
will be reduced; thus diminishing the pressure area
somewhat.

At this point however, the pressure area,

although no longer of crisis proportions,

is still large.

Consequently, there will be little change in the closed
gates, and relatively strict party control over both the
input and output areas will remain.

Although all outputs will emanate directly from
withinputs at this stage, there will be fewer withinput
demands which are actually promulgated.

The output

combination of round seven was relatively effective,
therefore there will be less pressure upon the system to
find output solutions which are satisfactory.

Resultingly,

more of the withinput demands will be "killed" by the
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decision making structure itself during this round.

Successive rounds of effective output combinations
will have a more significant effect upon these variables.
Diagram 5(b) illustrates the situation at the end of round
ten, or the fourth successive round of "generally effective"
outputs.

Here,

the successive rounds of want satisfaction

have caught up with and have overcome the previous rounds of
dissatisfaction,

causing a shift in the proportion of

potential demands to the level of supports,
in favour of the latter.

Consequently,

but this time

the "stress area"

is significantly reduced.

Behaviourally however, the decision making structure
is much more reluctant to withdraw strict controls than
the environment is to withdraw its dissatisfaction with
previous outputs.

To guarantee greater control over the

system and reassure the decision making structure of a
tranquil environment, only partial relaxation of control
will usually be accorded at this round.

Some gates may

be reopened to allow some direct environmental influence
and the boundary threshold may be extended somewhat.

If

distrust of the environment still prevails however,
these concessions may be more of a "nominal" type than
real.

Similarly,

the output area may be decreased somewhat,

as the decision making structure feels that the situation
warrants.
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Diagram 5(c) carries this ameliorating trend to its
obvious conclusion.

Over a period of time, during which

the output combinations remain at least satisfactory,

the

distrust of the environment by the decision making structure
may wain, and the situation approaches that which may be
termed "liberal".

Successive rounds of effective output

combinations have resulted in a most favourable proportion
of potential demands and supports within the environment,
heavily favouring the latter.

The potential demand factor

is not strong and the legitimacy accorded the entire system
of government by the environment is generally high; therefore
the "stress area" is near a minimum.

The decision making structure,

in consideration of

a most favourable environmental response to the processes
of the system, and wishing to avoid any recurrence of
build-up in the "stress area", will open as many gates
as is feasible.

It should be noted however,

that this

does not remove the party structures from the environment;
they still exist as before, with the exception that their
controlling activities are less severe.

However, since

there are more legitimate channels of direct influence
open to the non-party environment, the proportion of
inputs channeled by the party structure as compared to
inputs from the non-party environment (which by-pass the
gates and influence the decision making structure directly),
is lessened to some degree.

In effect then, as discussed

earlier, this necessarily means a lengthened threshold
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distance and a relaxation of party controls over both the
party and non-party environment with regard to the input
variable.

In turn then, there will be a much larger influx of
demands from the environment,

coming either directly through

open gates or through the established party channels and
gatekeepers.

Consequently,

the top-heavy proportion of

withinputs to inputs is reduced and the environment becomes
relatively more influential in the decision making process.
Since the subsequent outputs are legitimately more of a
product of the environment,

the latter’s favourable

acceptance of the output combination will be more likely.
This being the case, rigorous party controls over strict
implementation and enforcement of the outputs are not
necessary.

Also, due to the high level of supports and

legitimacy accorded the system, the quantity of outputs
(exclusive of international outputs) may be decreased,
especially those of the "associative" character.

For

these reasons, the "output area" will be substantially
reduced as well.

D. SOME ANALYTICAL REFINEMENTS

Such are the dynamics of the model in the third
dimension.

There are some misconceptions however, which

may arise from the diagramatic presentation, and so it is
to these that I now turn for some discussion and
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clarification.

The concept of "rounds", although clearly perceived
in the diagramatic version of the model,
obvious on the empirical level.

is much less

Decision making is a

continuous procedure in any system; this is the prime
function for which the system was set up.

The diagramatic

version may suggest that when a group of decisions have
been made (i.e. an output combination), no other decisions
are taken until that group completes the circular process.
If this were in fact the case,
of empirical identification.

there would be no difficulties
However, as the behavioural

data will confirm, output combinations may intercede
with others.

For example,

"output combination one" may

be promulgated and only part way through the feedback
process when "output combination two" is promulgated.

A

third output group may follow closely upon "combination
two" and, due to its more limited scope, ease of imple
mentation, etc., may actually supercede groups one and
two and complete the process first.

Thus, the "successive

rounds" of which I discussed earlier are more likely to
be imperfectly successive,

with much overlapping and

overtaking.

the rounds are "fuzzy" from an

Consequently,

empirical standpoint,

sometimes necessitating a distinction

between "rounds" in theory and "rounds" in practice.

Yet this is not a serious drawback since we are
concerned with the national scope of the decision making
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process of communist East Europe.

The decisions made

on this level are usually very "large" (e.g. the adoption
of a long term "plan") which provide the investigator
with a relatively easy task of tracing and behaviourally
verifying and accounting for the data which accrue.

Another variable warranting further discussion at
this point is the "stress factor".

As pointed out

earlier, the "stress area" is not solely representative
of the level of "potential demands", but rather the
proportion of which results from the feedbacks "clearing
house" operation.

If this is the case, a problem seems

to arise from the analysis of Diagram 5(a),

(b) and (c).

It is behaviourally apparent that there can be no limit
to "wants" or "potential demands".

Although output

combinations may be generally effective, out of sheer
optimism (or whatever reason) in the environment, potential
demands may certainly increase, while the level of supports
remains constant.
1)

If this is so, one may point out that:

the stress area is simply a function of
demand (and not of a proportion between

potential
the

potential demands and level of supports);
2)

and therefore.

Increases in the "stress

area"

are unlimited since "wants" are limitless.

The above problem arises if one fails to take proper
account of the distinction between "basic" wants and
"non-basic" wants.

It is this qualitative difference
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which is most significant as a catalyst of the "stress
area", not simply the quantity of wants put forth from
the environment,

Let me illustrate more clearly.

Let us hypothesize an equilibrium situation where
total inputs of "1Ü0 units" are comprised of "50 units"
of supports and "50 units" of potential demands.

The

50 units of supports represents the "satisfactory"
level of support resulting from previous output effec
tiveness.

The 50 units of potential demand represent

current interests, wants, etc., in the environment.
Suppose that out of these 50 units of potential demand,
there are 25 units of basic wants (enough food to live on,
enough clothes, housing and protection) and 25 units of
non-basic wants (electric toothbrushes, the latest fashions
from Paris, etc.,)

Now there are three possible situations,

First, if the decision making structure promulgates
an output combination which satisfies only the 25 units
of basic wants, then resulting supports for the system (at
the "equilibrium stage") will remain approximately the
same, since "major" or "basic" wants are satisfied.
The "stress area" also remains primarily the same since
the behavioural evidence will prove, as the theory of the
"economic rationale" illustrates, that individuals will
not increase pressure upon the system by either a change
in their "potential demands" or their "supports", if their
basic wants remain satisfied.

Therefore the "frustration"
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of non-basic wants does not create a crisis condition.

The second situation which may arise is that in
which the output combination does not satisfy the 2$ units
of basic wants, but rather the 25 units of non-basic wants.
In this case, supports for the system will decrease and
the unsatisfied wants will become stronger, creating a
substantial increase in the pressure area.

Even though

an equal quantity of the non-basic wants are satisfied
(i.e. 25 wants),
reinforced,

the frustrated "basic" wants will be

since an electric toothbrush has little

utility if one has no food.

It can readily be seen

therefore, that as the economic rationale indicates, wants
are ordered by the individual,

and one will only be

politically satisfied if the mo:re important, more "basic"
wants are fulfilled.

The third situation represents the case where the
output combinations are able to satisfy both the basic and
the non-basic wants.

It is then probable that supports

may become even higher than if just the basic wants are
satisfied.

(Supports,

similar to "wants", are theoretically

quantitatively unlimited).
environment,

Due to optimism in the

it may also be said that this situation

may create an even larger number of wants.

This is

undoubtedly true since it is obvious that many luxury
wants can be added to the wants expressed in the previous
rounds.

Yet this will not significantly effect the
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"stress area" if these wants are frustrated.

It should be clear therefore,

that as long as basic

wants are satisfied, the stress area will never reach
crisis proportions.

There is a possibility of "surplus

supports" (in the event that non-basic wants are satisfied
in addition to the basic wants), as well as a loss of
"surplus supports" (if these non-basic or "surplus" wants are
not satisfied).

Yet the basic stability of the system

derives from "basic" supports from the environment, and
this "basic support" is a result of output satisfaction
of "basic wants".

"Surplus" wants and supports therefore

only have a quantitative significance; the frustration of
even thousands of surplus wants will hot create a crisis
situation, while the prolonged frustration of one truly
basic want very well may!

In summary then, the "stress area" in the model is
primarily a correlation between output satisfaction of
basic wants and basic supports.

There may be a quantitative

increase in non-basic wants "ad infinitum", but as long as
basic wants are satisfied,

this will not create a significant

increase in the pressure area unless at some point of time
they become qualitatively significant (i.e. basic) in their
own right.

It should also be noted that the quality of "basicness"
of wants varies from one environment to another.

In less
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developed societies, basic wants are essentially "enough
food",

"adequate clothing",

"protection",

etc.

In a more

advanced society, these things may be taken for granted;
basic wants will be of a higher nature (e.g. the automobile
becomes a "necessity", as well as education, telephones,
and health insurance).

A word should also be said of the relationship between
the "stress area" and the economic rationale which was a
subject of discussion earlier.

As was pointed out in PART I,

the individuals in the environment surrender their ability
to give "free play" to their respective "utility streams"
to the decision making structure.

This does not however,

deny the existence of interests or "utility streams" in
individuals in the environment.

What it does mean is that

these utility streams rarely exercise direct influence
upon the decision making structure;

this is inherent in the

definition of the totalitarian system.

Yet the individuals,

collectively, may influence such decision making indirectly
by altering the "stress area" variable.

Every individual

will exert "wants" (but not necessarily demands) in their
order of priority in their particular "utility stream".
Obviously,

as indicated by the "rationale" and behaviourally

substantiated, the more basic wants will have priority
over the less b a s i c , since the more basic or more important
wants will render greater utility.

Therefore collectively,

to the degree that basic want strength is generalized
over the environment as a whole, the stress area will
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increase,

thus applying indirect pressure upon the

decision making structure.

1 believe this should eliminate the significant
misunderstandings which may arise from the model itself.
With these clarified,

I will now present the final model,

E. THE INTERNATIONAL ELEMENT

It would not require a very exhaustive accumulation of
behavioural evidence to demonstrate the significance of
international influence upon the decision making structures
of the East European communist societies.

Since these

political systems sprung from common origins during and
after World War II, owing their birth to the same communist
source and their "allegiance" to their original parent,
the U.S.S.R., can be readily understood.

Such "allegiance"

need not necessarily be voluntary, as the events in Poland
and Hungary in 19^6 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 testify.

It is certainly true however, that the last two
decades have brought many changes within what is generally
understood to be the "socialist camp", perhaps the most
significant being the evolutionary changes in communism,
both ideologically and in practice, and its subsequent
splitting into two major and several minor forms.
Consequently, allegiance to and influence of the "camp"
have also split,

making the lines of international
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socialist command and obedience somewhat hazy, irregular,
and unstable.

Yet even in the present, as was evidenced

by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, international influence
upon national decision making still exists, although the
strength of such influence seems to vary from one country
to another.

Of the East European group, Yugoslavia has

succeeded in perhaps being at least relatively independent,
although more subtle Soviet influences are still exerted
upon her.

Albania has not become much more independent,

but rather has switched her lines of allegiance from the
Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China.

Even

Roumania, within certain limits, has managed to escape
some of the undesireable international influence by virtue
of her strong economic interests.

Yet by the very fact that they are "possessions"
of the Soviet Union, derived from post-war political
card dealings, and that they represent strategic areas of
influence to the U.S.S.R., there remains a very significant
international element in each of their internal decision
making processes.

The model in its final form as Diagram 6

illustrates, is identical to that of Diagram 5, but with
the international variable added.

Although the international influence is also represented
as basically an input-output principle,
significant changes in the entire model.

there are some
Since the model

is now concerned with an international environment as well
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as a national one, there will necessarily be a "split
feedback", registering both internal and external environ
mental responses to the output combination.

The national

"control" (via the output area) over the effectiveness
of any East European state's output combination, will of
course be substantially limited to the internal environment.
No East European country can enforce its outputs upon the
decision making structure of the international environment.

The decision making structure(s) of the international
environment will generally consist of those of the socialist
camp, and may be dominated by one among them (e.g. the
U.S.S.R.)

They are presented in the model collectively

for diagramatic convenience;

however, analytically,

the

international decision making structure may often be
plural, since any one of the East European communist
decision making structures may be subject to the influence
of several others collectively.

The outputs of any East European communist state
provide the material for inputs into the decision making
structure(s) of the international environment (predominately
of the nature of "supports").

There will be no "gatekeeping"

activity however, and hence no boundary threshold concept,
since "inputs" will be directly communicated and "politi
cized" between the national decision making structure
(or more often the national environment) and the international
decision making structure(s).

However, there very well may
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be a "pressure area" build-up on the input side of the
international decision making structure,

since the "camp

leadership" (e.g. the Soviet Union) has as its goal, the
maintenance of its own power and influence over the rest
of the camp.

Therefore the individual East European

communist states may exert some pressure upon the "camp"
decision making structure(s) (e.g. that they produce less
heavy equipment for the "camp" and more consumer goods
for their own people).

A brief analysis of the Czechoslovakian crisis of
August, 1968 may be illustrative here.

The Czechoslovakian

decision making structure, between January and August 1968,
promulgated output combinations which were very satisfactory
to the internal environment, resulting in a very low
national pressure area, relatively open "gates", a large
threshold distance, and a less lopsided proportion of
withinputs to inputs.

In effect, Czechoslovakia presented

that syndrome of conditions which would indicate a
"liberal" regime.

However,

these same output combinations

during this period failed to generate similar tendencies
in the international sphere.

On the contrary, the international

feedback created a buildup in the pressure area of the
international system;

the Czechoslovakian output combinations

reflected a "de facto" loss of supports relative to demands,
and hence a loss of political influence of the "camp"
leadership over Czechoslovakia.

Innevitably, the inter

national decision making structure(s) (nominally the
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"Warsaw Pact Alliance", but in fact the Soviet Union),
countered:with international outputs, especially of the
associative variety,

derived mainly from "withinputs"

designed to relieve the "stress area".

These internal

outputs became direct inputs to the Czechoslovakian
decision making structure.

After successive rounds of

ineffective international output combinations (and
subsequent "stress build-up") the international output
area expanded also.

In addition, the international

outputs became decidedly authoritative in character,
resulting in the direct enforcement of these outputs
by the international decision making structure(s)
(i.e. invasion and military enforcement).

The international

decision making structure(s) subsequently followed up
with output combinations which were predominatly "associative"
in character, designed to legitimize the authoritativemilitary activity and reduce the stress area being built
up by the adverse responses by both communist and noncommunist states.

Following the invasion, the decision

making structure of Czechoslovakia was forced to reorient
its national output combinations towards a more orthodox
content.

The "gates" in the Czechoslovakian decision

making processes were to be closed for the most part, and
the threshold distance shortened.

Withinputs regained

their lopsided advantage over inputs from the environment,
and as could be predicted, the ensuing output combinations
failed to satisfy the environment, resulting in a certain
level of internal stress buildup.
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This brief treatment of tne Czechoslovakian crisis
more factually and empirically demonstrates two points that
should now be evident from this phase of the model.

First,

the mechanism of the international element clearly operates
upon the same principles as that of the typical decision
making system on the national level, with only the few
variations discussed.

Second, and even more significant,

is

the fact that no model of communism, especially of Eastern
Europe, can possibly be considered complete without taking
full account of the international variable;

linkage between

the decision making structure of the national state and
that of the parallel structure(s) on the international
scene is much too sbrong to be ignored.

With regard to the overall model, and within the scope
of its original two-fold objective,

it will succeed in

great measure if it contributes even towards the intelligent
awareness of the significance of the interrelationship
between the political and the non-political aspects of
society, between the behaviour of men in politics on the
one hand and their more distinctly socio-economic and psycho
logical activities on the other.

Unfortunately, time and

space have prevented me from engaging in the latter,
especially the sociological element,
but that is quite another thesis.
omission,

in very great detail;

Notwithstanding this

I believe that I have at least substantiated

the case for the need for political scientists to account
for and integrate these other social behaviours in order
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to arrive at a more meaningful, contextual, science of
politics.

By way of a concluding statement, and more specifically
in a communist vein,

I think the model presented clearly

demonstrates that in addition to the more precise descrip
tive, explanatory, and predictive merits obtained, this
type of analysis is capable of profoundly integrating the
elements of modern communism with the intangible variables
of social change.

Communist societies have been established

on the premise of achieving considerably different social
cultural objectives than the polities which preceded them.
In striving toward the realization of these goals they
rely on a perpetuation of their political rule by rooting
their power in a minority group of dedicated militants
who in turn monopolize control over all means of coercion,
communication and social organization.

However, it is now

clear that their propensity to reach their objectives,
and even to survive, cannot be anchored on their widely
touted organizational ability or Stalinist suppresion
of resistance.

They can never succeed in ultimately

escaping the cleavaging aspects inherent in human society
or isolating themselves from the forces of social change.
Long run viability, even in the sommunist society, will
necessarily

be a function of their capacity to obtain

the popular acceptance of their legitimacy,

their persuance

of goals which adequately satisfy the expectations of the
masses, and their talent in remedying social conflict
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without jeopardizing the dominant role of the party.

As the East European situation testifies, the
communist leaders and parties are finding it more and more
difficult to sustain their authority in an increasingly
hostile and intolerant social environment characterized
by industrial development,

increasing pressure for bureau

cratic and professional pluralism, rising intellectual
discontent, and cumulative popular demands for higher
living standards.

These countries cannot avoid the

environmental complexities which accompany industrial
modernity; and there is no social magic in the term "demo
cratic centralism".

The power which emanates from the

barrel of a gun only provides for a transitory and inchoate
control over society;

if the modern communist nations

are to survive this century,

they will have to master the

laws of socio-economic change or else bow to the crises
which such a failing will precipitate.

It is toward

gaining a more realistic and yet sufficiently sophisticated
body of knowledge of this too long abandoned and yet allimportant perspective,

that this paper is dedicated.
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